Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
1983

The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration
William W. Park
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Commercial Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William W. Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration , in 32 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 21 (1983).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2511

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

THE LEX LOCI ARBITRI AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
By
WILLIAM W. PARK*
"There must be no Alsatia in England where the King's writ does not run."**

LUKE'S gospel reports that Jesus once declined to arbitrate a family dispute
over an inheritance by asking a disgruntled sibling, "Who set me over you
to arbitrate?" Private resolution of business disputes raises a related
question: whence springs the arbitrator's authority to render a binding
award? A company that submits a controversy to arbitration may later
regret having abandoned recourse to the courts. On the day of reckoning,
the sage chosen to decide the dispute may no longer seem so wise to the
losing party, and the loser might consider refusing to comply with the
arbitrator's decision. Some legal system, therefore, must legitimise the
arbitrator's authority. Otherwise, the award remains an unenforceable
conciliation attempt that the parties are free to treat as mere foreplay to
litigation.
The country where the award is rendered traditionally has legitimised
arbitral authority subject to conditions, in the form of mandatory
procedural rules imposed on the arbitral proceedings. The proper scope of
these local curial norms-commonly known as the lex loci arbitri-hasbeen
problematic. In England, prior to 1979,1 national courts supervised arbitral
proceedings to ensure legally correct results. According to another model,
however, arbitration is subject to judicial control only to safeguard its
fundamental fairness. Yet a third model would free arbitration from any
constraints imposed by the legal system of the place where the award is
rendered.
*Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; visiting Professor of Law, Institut Universitaire de
Hautes Etudes internationales, -Geneva; Sometime Fellow, Selwyn College, Cambridge. ACIArb. For help
in thinking about the arbitral process, the author wishes to thank, but not to implicate, Professor W.
Michael Reisman.
.*Lord Justice Scrutton, in Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co. 1192212 K.B. 478, at p. 488.
I. English arbitration law was overhauled, as discussed in Part Ii of this Article, by the Arbitration Act
1979, effective on Aug. 1, 1979 (S.I. 1979 No. 750). On the Act's history, see 392 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.)
89 (1978); 397 t'arl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 434-64 (1978-79); 398 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 592-74, 1465-82
(1979). See also Commercial Court Committee, Report on Arbitration, Cmnd. 7284 (1978); Address by
Lord Diplock, the Fourth Alexander Lecture, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London (Feb. 28, 1978),
reprinted in (1978) 44 Arb. 107; Park, "Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration
Law" (1980) 21 Harv. Int. L.J. 87. For the most recent and authoritative treatise on English arbitration
law, see M. Mustill and S. Boyd, CommercialArbitration(1982).
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These alternative patterns for judicial intervention implicate competing
values that do not yield to facile analysis. The commercial community
desires finality in private dispute resolution. Yet, national judicial systems
may wish to further rival goals, such as the integrity of the adjudicatory
process and respect for the rights of third parties.
Scholars and practitioners alike have questioned the traditional view that
the lex loci arbitri governs the validity of an arbitration. Proponents of "denationalised" or "floating" arbitration assert that arbitral awards may be
detached from the law of the country of the proceedings and yet remain
enforceable. 2
The first part of this article explores the control normally exercised over
international commercial arbitration by the place of the proceedings. The
second part examines the way that English arbitration law encapsulates the
struggle to reconcile the rival goals of fairness and finality in private dispute
resolution. The author concludes that control of international commercial
arbitration by the lex loci arbitri commends itself if the local judge limits his
role to ensuring the integrity of the arbitral proceedings and respect for the
interests of third parties.

1. THE NATIONALITY OF ARBITRAL AWARDS

A. Territoriality of the Lex Arbitri
IN England prior to 1979 the High Court could force an arbitrator to submit
a point of law for judicial determination under the so-called "special case"
or "case stated" procedure. This practice was not introduced into Scottish
law until 1972.1 Even thereafter, the parties to an arbitration in Scotland
could exclude the procedure by pre-dispute agreement between the parties.
4
Such "ouster" of judicial jurisdiction was not possible in England.
In the case of James Miller v. Whitworth Street Estates5 an English
company contracted with a Scottish construction company for work on a
building in Scotland. English law governed the interpretation of the
2. Denationalised arbitration would be a more appealing prospect to this author if its proponents did not
assert the legally binding character of the "a-national award". Non-binding compromise and conciliation
have a long and honourable place in dispute resolution. Christians have been advised to settle disputes
among themselves through the church: Matthew 18:15-17; 1 Corinthians 6:1-7. The Talmud suggests that
litigants attempt to settle disputes by conciliation at the outset of a trial: Code of Maimonides, Book 14,
Book of Judges, at 66-67 (Yale U. Press, 1949). Neither of these mediation processes, however, necessarily
results in a legally enforceable award.
3. Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972, s.3(l).
4. Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co. [192212 K.B. 478.
5. [19701 I All E.R. 796 (H.L.).
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contract. Scotland, however, was the "seat" of the arbitration, where the
proceedings were held. After evidence had been heard, the English company
asked that the arbitrator "state a case" to the High Court. The arbitrator
refused, since under the law of Scotland he was the final adjudicator of
legal as well as factual questions. The House of Lords. upheld the
arbitrator's refusal. The arbitration was governed by the law of Scotland,
the place of the proceedings, notwithstanding that English law governed the
contract.
Two assumptions about the interaction of national law and commercial
arbitration inhere in this decision. The first is that arbitration is controlled
by some national law, a lex arbitri. 6 The lex arbitri is not necessarily the law
governing the substance of the dispute, nor the procedural rules applied by
the arbitrators. Rather, the lex arbitri governs the validity of the arbitral
process itself.
The second assumption underlying Whitworth is that the law of the
arbitration is the law of the place of the proceedings: the lex arbitri is the lex
loci arbitri. Thus an arbitrator must bow to mandatory norms of the
country in which he sits.7 Parties may choose the law governing the
contract. They may even choose some of the procedural rules applied by the
arbitrator to a matter such as cross-examination of witnesses. They do not,
however, choose the law governing the arbitration, except indirectly
through choice of its situs.
F.A. Mann has articulated this traditional view with force, arguing that
the pronouncements of an arbitral tribunal are not binding unless linked to
a specific system of national law:
Every right or power a private person enjoys is inexorably conferred by or derived from a
system of municipal law which may conveniently and in accordance with tradition be called
lexfori, though it would be more extact (but also less familiar) to speak of the lex arbitri. 8

The mandatory rules imposed by the lex loci arbitri do not yield to neat
classification. Many legal systems prohibit arbitration of disputes involving
sensitive public interests, such as the protection of investors in corporate
securities9 or contracts with state agencies. 0 Some require arbitrators to
6. See, e.g., Mann, "Lex Facit Arbitrum", in International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin
Domke, ed. P. Sanders (1967), at p. 157; Hirsch, "The Place of Arbitration and the Lex Arbitri" (1979) 34
Arb. J. 43.
7. For the present discussion, the place of the arbitral proceedings is assumed to be the place where the

award is rendered. The parties may choose the place explicitly or delegate the choice to an arbitral
institution.
8. Mann, op. cit. supra n. 6, at p. 159.
9. See Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
10. Eg. in France see Carbonneau, "The Elaboration of a French Doctrine on International Commercial
Arbitration: A Study in Liberal Civilian Creativity" (1980) 55 Tulane L.R., at pp. 29-30.
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state the reasons for their awards," or provide for the removal of

arbitrators who are inept 2 or unfair. 3 A few legal systems have provided
for appeal from arbitrator error on matters of law. 14
English judges traditionally have given the lex loci arbitri greater

significance than their French or American brethren. One Court of Appeal
decision held that the selection of London as a situs for arbitration implied
that English substantive law governed the issue of contract damages. 5 This
decision contrasts with American 6 and French 7 cases that have minimised

the influence of the law of the place of arbitration.
The traditional role of the lex loci arbitri has been questioned by scholars
and practitioners who suggest that an international commercial arbitral
award may "float" free from the constraints of the national law of the
place of the proceedings.' Such denationalised arbitration, producing an

"a-national" arbitral award,

9

marries well with the commercial motive

behind the trend toward greater arbitral autonomy in modern arbitration

law: to increase a country's attractiveness as a situs for arbitral
proceedings.20 This approach also permits national tribunals to concern
themselves less with disputes not implicating national interests, and
accommodates international business transactions in which the parties'
divergent nationalities create a special need for a neutral and private forum

for dispute resolution.2
"Denationalised" arbitration, however, has come to mean more than
self-restraint by the country of the proceedings in the imposition of local
procedural law. "Floating" awards, it has been argued, are and should be
enforceable outside the country of proceedings despite annulment where
rendered. For example, suppose arbitration is conducted in Azania, where

11. E.g. in Germany, see Bulow, Glossner and Laschet, "Arbitration in the Federal Republic of
Germany," in Arbitration in Europe (198 1), p. 83, at p. 90 (para. 3-3).
12. E.g. in England, see s. 23 of the Arbitration Act 1950, concerning arbitrator "misconduct."
13. E.g. in France, see Art. 1502(4) of the Nouveau Code de Procddure Civile.
14. See commentary on the "case stated" procedure in Part Ii of this article.
15. Tzortzis & Sykias v. Monarch Lines [19681 1 LI.L.R. 337 (C.A.). Sale of ship by Swedish owner to
Greek buyer; Greeks wanted application of Swedish law, which permitted recovery of pre-contract expenses
lost because of seller's breach; held that choice of London as situs for arbitration implied choice of English
law as the proper law of the contract.
16. See e.g. Mobil v. Asamera, 43 N.Y. 2d. 276, 401 N.Y.S. 2d 186 (1977). Arbitrators had power to
apply the 1975 version of International Chamber of Commerce rules rather than the 1955 version, thus
there was no requirement to follow New York discovery procedures to fill gaps in ICC rules.
17. See e.g. Libyan Maritime Co. v. Gotaverken Arendal, Cour d'Appel de Paris (Feb. 21, 1980),
reprinted in (1980) 107 J. Dr. Int. 660 and [19801 Revue de l'Arbitrage 524.
18. See generally Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbound: An Award Detached From the Law of the Country
of Origin" (1981) 30 L C. L.Q. 358; Lalive, "Les Regles de Conflit de Lois Appliqu6es au Fond du Litige par
L'Arbitre International Si6geant en Suisse" [19761 Revue de I'Arbitrage 155.
19. For an excellent survey of the concept of the "a-national award" see in A.J. van den Berg, The New
York Arbitration Convention of 1958(1981). pp. 28-51.
20. See infra nn. 70-72, and accompanying text.
21. See Scherk v. Alberto Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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the award is set aside on the ground that the parties did not validly consent
to arbitration. Should a court in Ruritania, where the loser has assets,
nevertheless enforce the award if it comes to a different conclusion about
the validity of the arbitration agreement? What if Azanian courts set aside
the award for error of law, a ground for annulment unknown to Ruritanian
law?
Varying degrees of floating arbitration might be contemplated. For
instance, Ruritania might take the position that annulment in Azania is
never relevant to enforcement in Ruritania. A less extreme position might
take annulment of an award in Azania as an impediment to enforcement in
Ruritania if the annulment was made for reasons considered appropriate
under Ruritanian law. For example, Ruritania might accept annulment for
arbitrator corruption, but not for arbitrator error of law.
Ruritanian courts, of course, may always deny recognition to an
arbitration defective under their own standards. So much is accepted by
both traditionalists and proponents of floating arbitration. The divisive
issue is whether Ruritanian courts should also defer to Azanian nullification
for violation of the latter's procedural norms.
Critical to the viability of "a-national" arbitration is the legal effect of an
arbitral award not linked to a national legal system. The distinguished
arbitration lawyer, Jan Paulsson, has written recently that "the binding
force of an international award may be derived ... without a specific legal
system serving as its foundation. '22 Focusing on the French case of
Gotaverken v. Libyan General National Maritime Transport Co.,23
Paulsson demonstrates that an international arbitral award may be
enforced even if not subject by the lex loci arbitri to the same appeal
procedures as a domestic award.
The arbitration in Gotaverken involved three tankers constructed by a
Swedish shipyard for a Libyan government agency. The Libyans refused
delivery, inter alia, on the ground that ship components had been made in
Israel in violation of Libyan boycott law. The arbitrators ordered the
Libyans to take delivery of the vessels and to pay the outsanding portion of
the price. The Libyans challenged the award, arguing that it violated the
public policy (ordre public) of France because of its failure to respect
Libyan boycott law. The Paris Cour d'Appel refused to hear the challenge

22. Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbound", op. cit. supra n. 18, at p. 368. Paulsson expressed his dangerous
heresy even more boldly in his native Sweden, asserting that the legal system of the place of arbitration did
not necessarily have "authority to rule on the validity of the proceedings as such - and thus the binding
effect of its result: the award". See Paulsson, "France and the Arbitral Process", 1981 Skijedom 40, at p.
42.
23. Seesupra n. 17.
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on the ground that the award was not French. Such an award, Paulsson
maintains, is enforceable "without a specific legal system serving as its
foundation".
The paradox of a legal obligation independent of a legal order suggests
Athena springing full-blown from the head of Zeus: a binding commitment,
free from any municipal law, just appears. Grasp of Paulsson's thesis
requires a conceptual leap to a document labelled "obligation" enforced
without respect to whether the document constitutes a valid obligation
under the legal system normally selected by the enforcement forum's choice
of law principles. In other words, the document receives contractual force
from the enforcement forum itself regardless of the otherwise governing
law.
That Paulsson should concern himself at all with the French decision in
the Gotaverken affair is surprising. One would expect illustration of his
thesis by an award annulled under the lex loci arbitri but nevertheless
enforced in a country where the loser has assets. In Gotaverken, however,
France refused to annul the award. If the arbitration is detached from the
country where rendered, then one would expect the nationality of the award
in the minds of French judges to be of marginal importance. Inquiry would
seem more properly focused on the way judges of the enforcement
24
forum-Sweden-determine the award's validity.
Paulsson's thoughtful analysis of the French court's view of the award's
nationality leads one to suspect that he would not have considered the
award a-national if French judges had held the contrary. This would suggest
that the country of the proceedings does determine the validity of an
international commercial award, in that the award will be unenforceable if
annulled under the lex loci arbitri.
Gotaverken and its progeny lend themselves to a less radical analysis than
suggested by Paulsson. An international arbitration, rather than being
"detached from its country of origin," receives substantially greater
autonomy, and is subject to fewer constraints, than a domestic arbitration.
The award in Gotaverken was not annulled. Rather, the French court found
the award not subject to a challenge procedure (appel en nullite) available,
only to French awards. Moreover, if the facts of Gotaverken are changed
slightly, so that the Swedes deliver cocaine rather than tankers, one wonders
whether the French court would exhibit a similar laissez-faire attitude
towards alleged public policy violations.

24. Paulsson has done an admirable job of examining the Swedish sequel to Gotaverken in "The Role of
Swedish Courts in Transnational Arbitration" (1981) 21 Va.J.LL. 211.
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Several months after Gotaverken, the Paris Cour d'Appel affirmed the
vitality of the traditional role of the lex loci arbitri with respect to another
international award. In Berardi v. Clair25 the balance sheet of a Gabonese
company was at issue, its shares having been sold by a Canadian (Berardi)
to a Frenchman (Clair). The arbitrator awarded the seller 23 million French
francs, and the Paris Tribunal de Grand Instance granted leave to enforce
the award in France. Three months later, the Geneva cantonal Cour de
Justice annulled the award as "arbitrary". The Cour d'Appel of Paris
thereafter quashed the lower court decision, refusing recognition
(exequatur) in France to an award set aside under the law of the place where
rendered.
In both Gotaverken and Berardi v. Clair, the parties had stipulated
arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce, but with a significant difference: in Gotaverken the 1975
version of the Rules was applied, whereas in Berardi v. Clair the arbitration
was subject to the 1955 version of the Rules. The latter provides for gaps in
the procedural rules to be filled according to the law of the country in which
the arbitrator holds the proceedings. The 1975 Rules, by contrast, provide
for such gaps to be filled by the arbitrator. One may speculate about the
enforceability of the award in Berardi v. Clair had it been rendered under
the 1975 Rules. It would seem misleading, however, to suggest that such
awards may be "detached" from the lexloci arbitri.
The present author knows of no award enforced after explicit annulment
where rendered. Post-annulment recognition would, however, seem
appropriate in two circumstances. The first would require that the
arbitration arise under the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (commonly referred to as the Geneva Convention
of 1961), covering disputes between nationals of different contracting
States. Annulment of an award in its country of origin constitutes a ground
for refusal of recognition under the European Convention only when
annulment is for specifically enumerated reasons, such as the invalidity of
the arbitral agreement or lack of proper notice to the parties. Thus if
Canada had adhered to the European Convention, the award in Berardi v.
Clair, discussed above, might have been enforceable in France, since
"arbitrariness" is not a ground for annulment under the Convention.
The second situation in which one might approve enforcement of an
award annulled in its country of origin is where the local judiciary is corrupt
or biased. For example, a judge of a country without a tradition of judicial

25. Unpublished case No. 11542, Cour d'Appel de Paris, MIre Chambre, June 20, 1980, discussed in
I.C.C.A. (1982) VII Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration319-21.
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independence might set aside an award rendered against its own government
merely to please the bureaucracy, without regard to the fairness of the
proceedings. Enforcement of such an award by a country where the debtor
government has assets would seem neither improper nor inappropriate.
The 1958 New York Arbitration Convention leaves open the theoretical
possibility that the lex arbitrimay be other than the law of the place of the
proceedings. Under Article V(l)(e), a non-domestic arbitral award may be
refused recognition on proof that it has been set aside by "a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award
was made." Annulment by an authority of the country "under the law of
which" an award is made could be construed as a supplementary, rather
than substitute, ground for refusal of recognition.
Debate over the nationality of awards is more than an academic quibble.
The critical importance of the lex loci arbitriwas strikingly illustrated by the
saga of Socit Europ~enne d'Etudes et d'Entreprise (S.E.E.E.) v.
Yugoslavia.26 Before World War II S.E.E.E. built a railroad in Yugoslavia
for which it was paid in devalued French francs. A panel of two arbitrators
found an implicit currency stabilisation provision and rendered an exparte
arbitral award in favour of S.E.E.E. in Lausanne on July 2, 1956. In an
action before the cantonal court of Vaud, Yugoslavia argued that an even
number of arbitrators violated mandatory dispositions of local law. The
Swiss court, reasoning that the arbitration was not governed by Vaud
cantonal law, refused deposit of the award and returned it to the parties.
In a subsequent action in the Netherlands to enforce the award, the Dutch
Supreme Court rejected the Yugoslav argument that the award was invalid
because it was not linked to any national legal system.27 The victory of the
"floating award", however, was short-lived. In a second decision the Dutch
Supreme Court held that the Swiss refusal to hear the Yugoslav challenge
had the same consequence as annulment of the award, which therefore was
refused recognition.28 The Dutch court considered the arbitrator's decision
to constitute a Swiss award notwithstanding the Swiss court's contrary
view.2 9

26. The award is published in English and in French in [1959] Journal Droit International1074.
27. Decision of Oct. 26, 1973, published in [1973] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 361. A French translation
is published in [19741 Revue de l'Arbitrage 318; discussed in Batiffol [19741 Revue de l'Arbitrage 326;
Iseman (1975) 1 Droit et Pratique du Commerce International 510; Int. Council Comm. Arb. (1976) I
Yearbook of Commerical Arbitration 195.
28. Decision of Nov. 7, 1975, published in Dutch in [19761 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie No. 774 and in
French in [19781 Revue det'A rbitrage 397.
29. For a French sequel, see the recent decision of the Cour de Cassation, No. 882, dated Oct. 13, 1981,
quashing a decision by the Cour d'Appel of Orleans, Dec. 13, 1979, that had refused recognition to the
award (on the grounds it was "illogical and unreasonable") and remanding the request for recognition of
the Cour d'Appel in Rouen.
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B. Scope of Application of the Lex Loci Arbitri
A legal system that subjects international arbitration to its judicial control
must decide which procedural norms are to be applicable. Judicial
intervention might be limited to ascertaining the award's basic integrity,
breached by an arbitrator who is not impartial, or who decides matters that
the parties never entrusted to his adjudication. On the other hand, the
courts also might concern themselves with the legal merits of the dispute.
The extent of judicial control will depend upon conclusions as to whether it
is more important that an arbitral award be correct, or that it be final.
Prior to 1979, English law had come down on the side of legal certainty,
and attempted to ensure that all disputes decided within the borders of
England and Wales would be subject to a uniform application of legal
principles. Although parties to a business dispute had agreed to give the
responsibility for its resolution to an arbitrator, the arbitral process still
could be vitiated whenever one party, fearful of losing, decided to break its
agreement to settle the dispute privately, and to try its chance instead before
a judge.
This tension between legality and finality represents a rivalry between the
two types of certainty: one related to the uniform application of legal
norms; the other concerned with the adjudicatory forum. The value of a
uniform application of legal principles perhaps is strongest when there is a
danger that private dispute resolution may become a means for the strong to
oppress the weak through disproportionately unequal bargaining power, or
when the interests of third parties may be affected by the dispute. In such
cases, courts arguably may have a duty to examine the legal substance of the
dispute and other matters that bear on the award's basic integrity, such as
arbitrator fraud, impartiality or excess of authority.
To put it another way, the judiciary need not concern itself with the
correctness of an arbitrator's conclusions merely to ensure a correct
interpretation of the parties' contract. Court intervention on the merits of a
dispute voluntarily submitted to arbitration is required only if an
arbitrator's decision directly implicates national or third party interests.
Intervention may be justified, for example, if an arbitrator's
misinterpretation of an oil supply contract would result in injury to the
consumers of the fuel, or when an arbitrator's interpretation of company
law frustrates a national policy of protecting the integrity of the market for
corporate securities. If national policies are not implicated, courts should
limit their role to ensuring that the award is not obtained through violation
of fundamental norms of procedural fairness, such as arbitrator fraud,
partiality or excess of authority.
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International arbitration is less likely than domestic arbitration to involve
such disputes. Even if it does, a national legal system still may

accommodate the needs of international trade and investment by refraining
from exercising supervision over the legal merits of the arbitration. The
United States Supreme Court adopted such an attitude in Scherk v. AlbertoCulver,30 a case involving allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations in the sale
of stock, normally a non-arbitrable issue in the United States. The policy in
favour of permitting a neutral private forum to settle international business
disputes outweighed the competing consideration of protecting investors

from fraud in the sale of investment securities.
Judicial control over the substantive legal. issues of an international
arbitration should be minimal. Parties to the dispute should have the
privacy for which they bargained. In addition, arbitrators should be free of
the threat of being overruled because of errors in their analysis, so that
reasoned awards will be rendered more frequently, thereby contributing to

the development of a modern "law merchant". 3'
Complete lack of judicial control, however, is undesirable. Even if the

arbitration involves neither citizens nor interests of the forum State,
national courts should ensure the integrity of awards rendered within

national borders. Such awards may benefit from recognition and
enforcement under the 1958 New York Convention. 32 Some parties to the
Convention, including the United States, limit its application to awards

rendered in the territory of another contracting State.33 By allowing an
award rendered on its territory to become binding, a State facilitates
enforcement of an award, and therefore should provide a mechanism for
challenging the award's procedural deficiencies.
Deficiencies in the award's integrity should be dealt with by the legal

system of the place of the proceedings. Otherwise, the losing party must
attack an invalid award in each of the many States where the award might
be enforced against its property. 34 The contesting party should have an
30. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
31. On the new law merchant see Goldman, "La Lex Mercatoria dans les Contrats et l'Arbitrage
Internationaux: Realit6 et Perspectives" (1979) 106 Journal Droit International 475.
32. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517; T.I.A.S. 6997; 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereafter cited as New York Arbitration Convention]. On the
New York Arbitration Convention, see generally A.van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention
of 1958 (1981). As of Feb. 1, 1981, 56 States including France, the UK and the USA are parties to the New
York Convention. Ibid. at p. 410.
33. See 9 U.S.C.A. s. 201 (1979). The right of contracting parties to restrict enforcement on the basis of
reciprocity is provided in Art. 1(3) of the New York Arbitration Convention.
34. A.J. van den Berg (op. cit. supra n. 19, at p. 30) makes this point in his discussion of the applicablity
of the Convention to "a-national" awards:
[llf
in a "de-nationalised" arbitration serious procedural violations have been committed, the aggrieved
party must have the right to have such award set aside.
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opportunity to expose procedural irregularities at the place of the
arbitration, which will normally have as great a claim as any other forum to
being mutually convenient to the parties.
Proponents of "denationalised" arbitration do not necessarily contest
the wisdom of such minimal control. For example, Paulsson suggests de
legeferenda (his own words) that the "judge at the place of the arbitration
is the best-placed authority to control the award", although he would limit
intervention to review of the arbitrator's compliance with minimum
standards such as those embodied in "international conventions",
presumably Article V (1) of the New York Arbitration Convention.35
C. The French Experience
THE French arbitration decree of May 12, 1981,36 was issued in the wake of
the Gotaverken case,37 which had caused speculation that an arbitral award
may be free from control- by the country of its origin. The prospect of anational arbitration raised concern that an award rendered in France might
not receive enthusiastic recognition outside France.38 The enforcement
forum, mindful of the lack of control over the arbitration's fairness in the
place of the proceedings, might subject French awards to stricter scrutiny.
Grounds to refuse recognition under the New York Arbitration Convention
might be construed broadly when awards are rendered under the reign of
arbitral anarchy. In Gotaverkent, it will be remembered, the Libyan
Martime Company had brought an action to set aside an arbitral award
rendered in Paris, ordering the Libyans to pay the outstanding purchase
price on three oil tankers constructed by a Swedish shipyard. The Paris
court declined to hear the challenge to the award on the ground that it
lacked jurisdiction.
The Decree of May 12, 1981, provided for limited judicial control over
the integrity of international arbitration conducted in France. The Nouveau
Code de Procodure Civile now contains the following specific grounds for
challenge of an international award rendered in France: 39
35. Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbound", op.cit. supra n. 18, at p. 370. See also authorities cited in ibid. at
n. 33. Article V(I) of the'Convention permits refusal of recognition, inter alia, on proof of the arbitrator's
failure to respect his mission, lack of proper notice to the parties or improper constitution of the arbitral
tribunal. Article V(2) permits refusal for violation of national "public policy".
36. Decree No. 81-500, May 12, 198 1, published in the JournalOfficiel de la Rdpublique Francaise,May
14, 198 1, at p. 1406. The most extensive commentary on the decree to date is that of Professor Fouchard, of
the University of Paris: Fouchard, "L'Arbitrage International en France apr6s le Decret du 12 mai 1981"
(1982) 109 JournalDroit International374.
31. See supratext accompanying n. 23.
38. See Craig, Park and Paulsson, "French Codification of a Legal Framework for International
Commercial Arbitration" (1981) 13 Law & Pol. Int. Bus. 727, at pp. 733-734, nn. 36 and 37.
39. Nouveau Code de ProcidureCivile, Art. 1502.
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If there was no valid arbitration agreement or the arbitrator decided on the basis
of a void or expired agreement;
(2) if there were the irregularities in the composition of the arbitral tribunal or in the
designation of the sole arbitrator;
(3) if the arbitrator has decided in a manner incompatible with the mission conferred
upon him;
(4) whenever due process (literally: the principle of an adversarial process) has not
been respected;
(5) if the recognition or enforcement is contrary to international public policy (ordre
public international).
(1)

The fifth ground for challenge refers to the public policy of France,
rather than an international norm. Mandatory French public policy will
impose itself less extensively when the dispute has an international
character. 40
With the exception of ordre public, the grounds for annulment of an
award under the new Decree are not dissimilar to the grounds for vacating
an award provided in section 10 of the US Arbitration Act:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators;
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing
... or in refusing to hear evidence .... ;
where the arbitrators exceeded their powers....

Control of an arbitral proceeding according to such standards provides
the loser of an unfair proceeding the opportunity to have the award set aside
where rendered. Without such norms imposed by the lex loci arbitri, the
losing party would be required to defend against the enforcement of the
award wherever he had assets. Moreover, the country of the award debtor's
property may be an even more fortuitous and less acceptable forum than the
country of the proceedings.
An award rendered by a corrupt arbitrator in London or Paris should be
susceptible to annulment in London or Paris. Fairness dictates that the
losing company not be required to defend against the enforcement of the
award against its assets in Ruritania and Azania, where the local judges may
be even less concerned with the dispute than those of England or France.
The British Parliament, when overhauling English arbitration law in
1979, debated the nature of several other policies justifying judicial
intervention in the arbitral process. This debate provides the occasion for a
deeper case study into the competing goals that affect the scope of arbitral
autonomy.
40. See H. Batiffol and P. Lagarde, Droit International Public (6th edn. 1974), Tome , at p. 459, para.
366. On the requirement that an international award respect French ordre public international, see
P. Fouchard, L Arbitrage Commercial International (1965), ss. 515-528.
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II. THE PRISM OF ENGLISH ARBITRATION LAW

THE recent history of English arbitration law presents a paradigm of a
national legal system attempting to reconcile the rival desiderata of justice
and finality. Like a prism, discussion of these developments may serve to
separate the themes inhering in the complicated interaction between judge
and arbitrator.
A. The "Special Case": The Uniqueness of English Procedure
FOR almost a hundred years prior to 1979, commercial arbitration in
London had been subject to the so-called "special case" or "case stated"
procedure by which a party could compel an arbitrator to submit a point of
law to the High Court. 41 Submission of the legal issue during the
proceedings was called a "consultative case". Submission at the end of the
proceedings was referred to as stating a case in the form of "alternate

awards" .42
The uniqueness of English law (and the law of those Commonwealth
countries following the English model) lay not in the right to appeal the
arbitrator's conclusions on matters of law, but rather in the timing of the
appeal before formal delivery of the arbitrator's award. This pre-award
appeal meant that the arbitrator's decision might be refused recognition and
enforcement in a country in which the debtor had assets because the award
in the form of a special case might not be deemed "binding" under the 1958
New York Convention. 43 If the arbitrator had stated a "consultative"
special case, the judge decided the legal issue and then remitted the case to
the arbitrator; if the arbitrator had made alternate awards, the court had to
choose between one or the other. Until the High Court had answered the
legal question stated by the arbitrator, there was no final award in a legal
sense, even though courts in practice might refer to the arbitrator's
preference or informal decision as his award. Questions of fact were outside

41. A voluntary special case procedure originally applied to commercial arbitration under the Common
Law Procedure Act 1854. Courts were given power to order statement of the case by the Arbitration Act
1889.
42. Arbitration Act 1950, s.21.
43. See Art. V(1)(e). The Convention does not settle whether an award is "binding" before appellate
review. In Libyan Maritime Co. v. Gotaverken Arendal AB, Swedish Supreme Court Decision No. SO 1462,
Aug. 13, 1979, the Supreme Court of Sweden held that a pending challenge to the award in the Gotaverken
case, discussed supra text accompanying n. 23, did not constitute a ground for refusal of enforcement of the
award in Sweden. See Paulsson, "The Role of Swedish Coupts in Transnational Commercial Arbitration"
(1981) 21 Va. J. Int.L. 211,at pp. 236-37.
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the scope of the court's authority. The line between fact and law, however,
was thin; courts had wide discretion to find legal elements in most issues. 44
Statement of the case was not always beneficial to the requesting party. In
one amusing Court of Appeal case, Ismail v. Polish Lines, 41 a claimant
actually succeeded in reducing the amount of his recovery by insisting on a
special case. In Ismail, potatoes were shipped from Egypt to England and
had rotted during transit due to improper loading. The arbitrator was
willing to award two-thirds of the sum claimed as damages by the shipper,
one Dr. Ismail. The shipper, however, wanted it all and insisted on
statement of a case. His stubbornness was costly. The Court of Appeal
decided that Dr. Ismail was estopped from receiving anything because his
brother had been at the loading dock in Alexandria, exhorting the ship's
captain to pack the potatoes tighter.
In 1922, when the Court of Appeal held that the supervisory jurisdiction
of English courts could not be abrogated by contract, any escape from
judicial review was foreclosed. Referring to a part of London near Fleet
Street that had been a sanctuary for criminals,4 Lord Justice Scrutton
declared: "There must be no Alsatia in England where the King's writ does
not run." ' 47 The Court of Appeal thus considered it contrary to English
48
public policy to condone any "erroneous administration of the law".
The highwater mark of court intervention came in 1973, in a case
49
frequently referred to as the "Lysland", named after the ship involved.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that agreements to arbitrate disputes in
London were made under the assumption that legal issues could be referred
to judicial determination. Lord Denning ordered the case to be stated over
the arbitrator's objection, and set forth a tripartite test for determining
when arbitrators should be forced to state a special case in the future. The
point of law, said Denning, should be: 0
..real and substantial and such as to be open to serious argument and appropriate for
decision by a court of law...;
...clear cut and capable of being accurately stated as a point of law...;
(and) . . . of such importance that the resolution of it is necessary for the proper
determination of the case.

44. See Bunge v. Kruse 119761
1LI.L.R. 357 (1975 case). Sale of soya bean meal to Belgian buyer (Bunge

SA) by German seller, frustrated by 1973 US grain export embargo; Grain and Feed Trade Association
(GAFTA) finding of "accord and satisfaction" in settlement agreement held to be matter of law, not fact,
on case stated by GAFTA Board of Appeal.
45. [1976) 1 Q.B. 893 (C.A.).
46. See Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law (5th edn. 1956), p. 43 1.
47. Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmit & Co. [192212 K.B. 478, at p. 488.
48. Ibid at p. 489.
49. Halfdan Grief & Co. A/S v. Sterling Coal & Nay. Corp. [1973] 1 Q.B.843 (C.A.).
50. Ibid. atpp. 861-62.
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Thereafter, arbitrators apparently feared that denial of an application

made by a party to state the case, other than the most frivolous requests,
could be considered arbitrator "misconduct", a ground upon which an
award might be set aside.5
One consequence of the special case procedure was that it prevented an
arbitrator in England from deciding according to his own concept of equity
and fairness, 5 2 or as amiable compositeur. 3 The 4arbitrator was required to
5
apply a "fixed and recognisable system of law".
B. The Call for Reform
LEGAL scholars, legislators, and judges criticised the case stated procedure,
alleging that it provided a delaying tactic for undeserving parties who feared
they were about to lose an arbitration on the merits and wanted to put off
the day of reckoning." The arbitrator was required to prepare the
consultative questions of alternative awards; the High Court had to hold a
hearing that might involve full argument; and appeal might be taken to the
Court of Appeal, and thence to the House of Lords. Meanwhile, by virtue
of the delay, the unmeritorious party received the equivalent of an interest56
free loan in the amount of the unpaid award.

The conception of the 1979 reform5 7 might be set on February 28, 1978,
when Lord Diplock delivered the Fourth Annual Alexander Lecture to the
Institute of Arbitrators, entitled "The Case Stated-Its Use and Abuse". 58
Diplock described the problem just mentioned: that unscrupulous parties
had used the case stated procedure to delay payment of their contractual
obligations. Five months later, a Commercial Court Committee,59 chaired

51. See Commercial Court Committee Report, supran.1, at p. 6, para. 12.
52. See Schmitthof, "The Supervisory Jurisdiction of English Courts", in InternationalArbitration:
LiberAmicorumforMartin Domke, ed. P. Sanders (1967), p. 289, at p. 298.
53. On amiable composition, see generally E. Loquin, L'Amiable Composition en Droit Compar et
International(1980).
54. Orion Cia v. Belfort Matts [19621 2 LI.L.R. 257, at p. 264 (dispute over quota shares in reinsurance
treaty).
55. See parliamentary debates, supra n. 1.See also Commercial Court Committee Report, supra n. 1,at
p. 8, Diplock, op.cit. supra n. I, and 397 Part. Deb. at col. 437.
56. For examples of the types of cases stated, see the author's survey in Park, "Judicial Supervision of
Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1979" (1980) 21 Harv. Int.
L.J. 87,
at p. 95 and Annex.
57. Reform had been considered unsuccessfully in 1927 (Report of the Committee on the Law of
Arbitration, Cmnd. 2817) and 1962 (Commercial Court Users Conference Report, Cmnd 1616, para. 30).
58. Alexander Lecture, supra n. 1.
59. The statutory establishment of the Commercial Court in 1970 (Administration of Justice Act 1979,
s. 3), recognised a practice inaugurated in 1895 by resolution of the Queen's Bench Division of the High
Court whereby cases on a "commercial list" were assigned to High Court judges with special expertise in
commercial matters.
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by then High Court Justice, John Donaldson (now Master of the Rolls),
6°
issued a report recommending abolition of the special case procedure.
The Commercial Court Committee also recommended abolition of
another High Court procedure: the power to set aside an award for "error
of law on its face". 61 This procedure had made arbitrators hesitant to
62
deliver reasoned awards for fear that they would be quashed.
The Commercial Court Committee proposed a more restricted judical
review procedure. Awards would be final when rendered, and the right of
appeal to the High Court would be limited to legal questions that might
substantially affect the rights of the parties. The court was to be given the
power to impose conditions on the granting of leave to appeal-such as a
deposit-which would reduce frivolous appeals. There would continue to be
a procedure that roughly approximated the .old "consultative case" in
situations in which this procedure would result in "substantial savings in
cost to the parties". 6 Moreover, the Committee recommended that the
right to appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal be limited to
questions of general importance to the relevant trade or industry.
The Committee considered what it called the "entrenchment" of judicial
review-in other words, the prohibition on contractual exclusion of court
supervision. 64 The Committee indentified four classes of disputes that might
require different treatment: domestic disputes (where both parties were
British and the contract was governed by British law);65 international
disputes (where at least one party was foreign); disputes governed by
foreign law; and the so-called "special category disputes", arising out of
insurance, maritime and commodities contracts. The Committee
recommended that parties should always have the right to exclude judicial
review after a dispute has arisen, but that contractual exclusion of judicial
review of future disputes be permitted only for international contracts and
contracts governed by foreign law. For the latter, exclusion would be
automatic, and also rather academic, since proof of foreign law is treated in
England not as a legal issue, but as proof of a fact and not subject to
judicial review. 66

60. Iln 1977 a Colnmercial Court Committee was created to link the users of the Court and the Court
itself. ('onunitce imembers include representatives of London's merchants, bankers, and arbitrators, as
well as hc six Conmercial Court Judges who serve ex officio.
61. Arbitration Act 1950, s. 22.
62. See Coutercial Court Committee Report, supra n. 1, at pp. 8-9 (paras. 25-31).
63. Ibid. a( p. It (para. 36).
64. SecCzarnikow v. Roth, Schmit & Co. [192212 K.B. 478.
65. All United Kingdolm residents-including those in Scotland and Northern Ireland-were included,
although the Act applies only to arbitrations conducted in England and Wales.

66. SecA. )iccy and J. Morris, Conflict of Laws (9th edn. 1973), pp. 1124-33, citing Ottoman Bank of
Nicosia v. Chakarian 119381 A.C. 260, at p. 279 (P.C.).
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Entrenchment of review for domestic contracts rests on a concern for
parties with limited bargaining power or sophistication. It is a prophylactic
rule intended to prevent the unwilling renunciation of recourse to courts
because of a stronger party's threat of refusal to deal with a weaker party
who did not agree to arbitration.
An entirely different consideration, however, preoccupied the Committee
in its treatment of disputes arising from maritime, insurance and
commodities agreements. In these areas, English law had been the world's
pre-eminent and preferred law-or so said the Committee, which felt that
judicial review of such cases would be fruitful to the continued development
of English law.
Finally, the Committee recommended a cosmetic change in the term
"misconduct"-for which an arbitrator might be removed, or his award set
aside. 67 Such an opprobrious term was deemed objectionable to describe
procedural errors and omissions. The Committee did not recommend
abolition of the High Court's right to remove an arbitrator or set aside an
award for such errors or omissions, but merely found the terminology
offensive.
The Committee did not recommend curtailment of the High Court's
general right to remit awards to the arbitrators. 6 This is rather surprising in
light of the design of the Act. The power to send an award back to the
arbitrator seems to be a weapon for judicial intervention as formidable as
the power to force the arbitrator to state a case.
Eight months after the Committee's Report, Parliament enacted the
Arbitration Act 1979, which became effective for all arbitrations
commencing on or after August 1 of that year. 69 The Act modifies, but does
not supersede, the Arbitration Act of 1950. The Bill originally had been
introduced into the House of Lords, where extensive debate went on during
late 1978 and early 1979. Following announcement of the May General
Election, the Bill was rushed through the House of Commons on the night
of April 2, and received the Royal Assent on April 4.
Commerical as well as legal concerns motivated Parliament. The Act was
viewed as a way to increase London's importance as a situs for
transnational arbitration. During the parliamentary debates, Lord David
Hacking, who had practised law in New York, recounted in the House of

67. Arbitration Act 1950, s. 23.
68. Ibid. s. 22.
69. S.I. 1979 No. 750 (The Arbitration Act 1979 (Commencement) Order 1979). Parties to an arbitration
commencing before Aug. I, 1979, may agree in writing that the provisions of the Act shall apply to an
arbitration already in force.
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Lords that parties to international contracts were discouraged from
choosing London as the situs for arbitration because of the case stated
procedure.70 Lord Cullen of Ashborne ventured an estimate that a new
arbitration law might attract to England as much as £500 million a year of
"invisible exports", in the form of fees for arbitrators, barristers,
solicitors, and expert witnesses." The reform's utility for marketing
London as a situs for arbitration was also noted by the candid Lord Lloyd
of Kilgerran, a patent barrister, who declared that "[tihe main object of
2
this Bill is to attract arbitration to London".
Parliament evinced special concern that London should be more
extensively used as a situs for the resolution of so-called "supra-national"
disputes, especially those arising from contracts entered into by
governments of developing nations, for public works such as the
construction of airports or harbours, or for the exploitation of natural
resources.7 3 These nations are sensitive to the publicity, and the perceived
affront to sovereignty, in submitting their disputes to the jurisdiction of
courts of another country. No consensus of opinion exists on whether
arbitration involving a sovereign State may be removed from the control of
74
the lex loci arbitri.
Presumably, however, a more autonomous arbitral
process would be viewed as an attractive alternative to litigation before
foreign courts.
The extent to which the Act will have this desired effect is open to
question, however, since the governments of many developing nations,
particularly in Latin America and the OPEC countries, have manifested
some mistrust of arbitration taking place outside their borders 71 The wellknown "Calvo doctrine" requires that foreigners submit disputes arising
out of State contracts to resolution by local courts. Prohibitions on nonnational arbitration of State contracts have appeared in the constitutions of

70. 392 Parl. deb., supra n. 1, at cols. 89-95.
71. 392 Parl Deb., supra n. 1, at col. 99.
72. 398 Parl Deb., supra n. 1, at col. 536. See also the remarks of the Lord Chancellor in 397 Parl Deb.,
supra n. I, at col. 441: "It is important that the City of London ... not be hampered in the maintenance
and expansion of [its] important and historical role in arbitration matters."

73. See comments of Lord Hacking at 392 Parl. Deb., supra n. 1, at col. 89; Lord Diplock, Alexander
Lecture, supran. 1, at p. 112; Commercial Court Committee Report, supra n. l, at p. 12 (para. 45).
74. Compare the award in BP v. Libya, Oct. 10, 1973 (1979) 53 I.L.R. 297 (award rendered under
national law of place of arbitration) with awards in Saudi Arabia v. Aramco (1963) 27 I.L.R. 117 and
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./CaliforniaAsiatic Oil Co. v. Libya (1978) 17 I.L.M. 3; (1979) 53 I.L.R.

389 (arbitrators held that jurisdictional immunity of State precludes subjecting proceeding to lex loci
arbitri).
75. See generally, McLaughlin, "Arbitration

and Developing Countries" (1979)

13 Int. Law 211;

Delvolve, "Arbitration and Public Policy in Developing Countries", in Arbitration and the Licensing
Process, eds. R. Goldscheider & M. de Hass (1981), at p. 6-103.
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El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela,76 in the statutes of

Colombia, Chile and Argentina," and in the treaty establishing the Andean
Common Market. 78 Latin American countries generally have not adhered to
the 1958 New York Convention.
Oil-exporting nations manifested a similar hostility to non-local

arbitration in a 1967 OPEC resolution providing that "disputes arising
between a Government and operator shall fall exclusively within the
jurisdiction of competent national courts

.

.. "9 The "Group of 77" at the

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
articulated their aversion to arbitration in Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, which provides that controversies
arising out of nationalisation of foreign-owned property shall be settled by
tribunals of the nationalising State. 0 The UNCTAD Draft Code of
Conduct on Technology Transfer, as initially drafted by the Group of 77,
contained similar language. 8
82
Black African nations do not seem to share Latin American attitudes.
This difference may be due in part to the fact that many African legal

systems are patterned on French or British models. Many African countries
have ratified the 1958 New York Convention and83 the World Bank's
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes.

Historical perspective may be useful to an understanding of developing
nations' mistrust of transnational arbitration. The intervention that
industrialised nations historically exercised on behalf of their nationals
frequently involved arbitration perceived as consciously or unconsciously
84
partial to economically dominant countries.

76. See Wesley, "The Procedural Malaise of Foreign Disputes in Latin America: From Local Tribunals
to Fact Finding" (1975) 7 Law &Plcy. Int. Bus. 813, at p. 820.
77. Mexico restricts the effect of its constitutional Calvo clause to ownership of land and concession
rights.
78. Art. 51 of the Common Regime for the Treatment of Foreign Capital and Concerning Trademarks,
Patents, Licences and Royalties.
79. OPEC Resolution XVI-90, reprinted in (1968) 7 Int. LegalMats. 1183.
80. See Park, "Legal Issues in the Third World's Economic Development" (1981) 61 B.U.L.R. 1321, at
pp. 1326-30.
81. The UNCTAD Draft Code of Conduct on Technology Transfer is reprinted in (1980) 19 Int. Legal
Mats. 773. See Code Appendix D, ibid at p. 807, for the "Group of 77" proposal.
82. See Tiewul and Tsegah, "Arbitration and the Settlement of Commercial Disputes: A Selective Survey
of African Practice" (1975) 24 L C.L. Q. 393.
83. See list of signatories to the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York, 1958) printed at 9 U.S.C.A. s. 201, and list of Contracting States and Signatories to the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment. Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (575
U.N.T.S. 159), International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID/3/Rev.2.
84. One might suppose that there would be greater Third World resistance to the rules of institutions
dominated by one national group, such as the American Arbitration Association or the London Court of
Arbitration, than to those of more international institutions, such as UNCITRAL, ICSID and the
International Chamber of Commerce.
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Arbitration agreements may also be resisted because they serve to
stabilise contract terms that governments of developing countries wish to
renegotiate. The multinational enterprise may respond to an attempted
renegotiation by instituting arbitration, thereby bringing adverse publicity,
and perhaps even an enforceable award, against the government. 5
The developing nations' hostility to arbitration may have an echo in the
resistance of Western firms to arbitration in the Third World. In part, this
may be due to logistical considerations.8 6 More significant, however, is the
concern that a developing nation might set the award aside and thus render
87
it potentially unenforceable under the 1958 New York Convention.
C. The Arbitration Act 1979
THE 1979 Act abolished the special case, along with the common law
jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside or remit an award for error of law
on its face, 8 replacing these procedures with a more limited right of appeal
to the High Court. 89 Awards are now final, and thus enforceable
immediately, even if appeal is allowed later. Appeal may be made only with
the consent of the opposing party 9° or with leave of the court 9' which will
not be granted unless the determination of the legal question "could
substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties". 92 The court
has discretion to attach conditions to its leave to appeal; for instance, it may
require security for enforcement of the award. 93 The High Court decision
may be taken to the Court of Appeal only if the High Court has certified
94
that there exists a matter of "general public importance".
The High Court may order an arbitrator to state the reasons for his
decision if a party so requests before the decision, 9 or if there are "special
reasons" why such a request was not made. % A question of law arising
during the proceedings can be referred to the court for interlocutory

85. Arbitration agreements are particularly significant as waivers of sovereign immunity. See Delaume,
"State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration" (1981) 75 Am.J.Int.L. 794.
86. For example, Paris and London would generally be considered more convenient than Cairo or Kuala
Lumpur.
87. Art. V (l)(e), New York Arbitration Convention, supra n. 32.
88. Arbitration Act 1979, s. 1(1).
89. Ibid. s. 1(2).
90. Ibid. s. l(3)(a).
91. Ibid. s. l(3)(b).
92. Ibid. s. 1(4).
93. Ibid. s. 1(4) See e.g. Mondial Trading v. Gill& Dreyfus [19801 2 LI.L.R. 376.
94. Ibid. s. 1(7).
95. Ibid. s. 1(6).
96. These "special reasons" are not defined by the Act.
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clarification in a manner similar to the former "consultative case" on
request by the arbitrator or all parties". 97
The Act's most significant provision with respect to international
arbitration is its authorisation of "exclusion agreements", 98 ousting the
High Court of some of its supervisory function, but not its powers to remit
an award to the arbitrator99 or to set aside an award for arbitrator
"misconduct".1°° Agreement to exclude judicial intervention may always be
made after arbitration has begun. However, parties to international
agreements have the right to contract out of judicial review of future
disputes by a clause in the principal contract itself. In what the Act calls
"non-domestic" contracts,10 parties may agree in writing to abrogate three
tyles of court intervention: 102 appeal to the High Court;0 3 the court's power
to order reasoned awards;'0 4 and the right to apply for interlocutory
clarification of a question of law. 0 5 All of these procedures are still open to
the parties through joint action,'10 but cannot be required where one of the
parties resists and a valid exclusion agreement exists. 107
The Act expressly makes exclusion agreements effective as a bar to court
intervention when there are allegations of fraud between the parties. 08
Absent, an exclusion agreement, the High Court would be able to stay any
arbitration in which one of the parties is accused of fraud,' °9 in order to give
criminal courts the opportunity to deal with the fraud."10 Application of
exclusion agreements to inter-party fraud prevents a party from hindering
the arbitration by an allegation of fraud.
Dishonesty or corruption on the part of an arbitrator, of course, remains
subject to court jurisdiction. Courts may deal with arbitrator misconduct by
setting aside the award,"' remitting the award for reconsideration," 2 or

97. Ibid.s.2(2)(a).
98. Ibid.s. 3.
99. S. 22(1)of the Arbitration Act 1950.
100. Ibid. s. 23(2).
101. Arbitration Act 1979, s. 3(6)-(7).
102. Ibid. s. 3(6).
103. Ibid.s. 1(3)(b).
104. Ibid.s. 1(5)(b).

105. Ibid. s.2(l)(a).
106. Ibid. ss. 1(3)(a), 1(5)(a) and 2(l)(b) are unaffected by exclusion agreements.
107. The validity of the exclusion agreement will depend on whether the contract is "domestic" or "nondomestic": 1979 Act, s. 3(6).

108. Ibid. s. 3(3).
109. Arbitration Act 1950, s.24(2).
110. On inter-party fraud, see R. Gibson-Jarvie and G.Hawker, Guide to Commercial Arbitration Under
the 1979 Acl (1980), pp. 28-29.
11i.S.23 of the Arbitration Act 1950 covers arbitrator "misconduct".
112. Arbitration Act 1950, s.22.
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revoking the authority of the arbitrator. I3 The Act expressly limits the right
to oust the court's jurisdiction except with respect to the three enumerated
powers of answering interlocutory questions of law, hearing appeals and
requiring reasoned awards.1 1 4 Thus, English judges might exercise their
former interventionist habits by breathing new life into residual powers
under the 1950 Arbitration Act. The context of the prevailing judicial
attitude may therefore be more important than the text of the statute.
Exclusion agreements are intended for what Lord Diplock referred to
with the neologism "one-off" contract: an agreement negotiated on an ad
hoc basis for one transaction only." 5 The "one-off" contract presumably is
negotiated at arm's length by parties with relatively equal bargaining power,
making it unnecessary to provide a non-waivable right of judicial review to
protect the weak or unsophisticated against unconscionable demands for
relinquishment of their legal rights.
An international arbitration agreement is defined in the negative as one
that is not "domestic". A "domestic" agreement is also defined in negative
terms as an agreement to which neither
(a) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any
State other than the United Kingdom, nor
(b) a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central
management and control is exercised in, any State other than the
United Kingdom,
is a party at the time the arbitration agreement is entered into. "16
An arbitration is thus non-domestic if at least one of the parties (or the
situs of the proceedings) is foreign. An arbitration agreement, however,
might be domestic even if the contract is governed by foreign law.
Compared with the French concept of an international arbitration, the
English definition of a non-domestic agreement 'appears somewhat
mechanical. The scope of English inquiry is limited to the parties' residence
and nationality. The more nuanced Gallic approach, however, considers the
economic character of the entire controverted transaction. The 1981 French
Arbitration Decree" 7 defines an international arbitration as one that

113. Ibid. s. 23. On the way that English judges deal with arbitrator prejudice, see Shenton, "Arbitral
Impartiality: The Attitude of the English Courts" (1980)8 nt. Bus. Lawyer 76.
114. Arbitration Act 1979, s. 3(4).
115. See the Lord Chancellor's statements in 397 ParI. Deb., supra n. 1, at cols, 438-39; Commercial
Court Committee Report, supra n. I, at p. 7. The term "one-off" was used by Lord Diplock in the
Alexander Lecture, supra n. 1, at p. 112, to refer to an agreement negotiated ad hoc, as opposed to a
standard form agreement.
116. Arbitration Act 1979. supra n. 1, s. 3(7).
117. Decree No. 81-500, May 12, 1981,published in Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Francaise, May 14,
1981, at p. 1406.
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"implicates international commercial interests"," 8 leaving it to the courts
to decide what this means. 119 The American notion of an international
arbitral agreement or award falls somewhere between the French and
English concepts. 20 The American statute implementing the 1958 New York
Convention excludes from the Convention's coverage an agreement or
award arising out of a relationship entirely between American citizens, but
the statute includes within its scope commercial relationships between
American citizens if the contract involves foreign property, requires
performance abroad, or has a reasonable relationship with a foreign
country.
In domestic disputes,' 2' an exclusion agreement may be entered into only
after the arbitration has begun. 22 Although the Act applies only to
arbitrations taking place in England and Wales,' 23 the concept of a
"domestic" agreement includes one entered into by a Scots and/or a
Northern Irish party. 2 4 Reluctance to permit "ouster" of the judiciary's
supervisory jurisdiction in domestic disputes apparently arose from a desire
to protect the British from other British who might try to use heavy
negotiating techniques, or refusals to deal, in order to impose exclusion
clauses. 125
Pre-dispute exclusion agreements are void as to the so-called "special
category" contracts identified by the Commercial Court Committee in the
areas of shipping, 12 6 insurance, 2 7 and commodities. 2 ' Special category
international contracs may include pre-dispute exclusion agreements only
if governed by foreign law, 129 which is normally considered to be a matter of
fact anyway 30 and thus not subject to judicial review. This concept of a
"foreign" agreement relates to the proper law of the contract rather than to
the parties' residence or nationality.
118. Nouveau Code de Proc6dure Civile, Art. 1492.
119. The concept of international arbitration that evolved in French case law prior to the 1981 Decree
includes considerations such as execution and performance of the contract and the residence and nationality
of the parties. See Delaume, "What is an International Contract? An American and Gallic Dilemma"
(1979) 28 L C.L.Q. 258.
120.9 U.S.C. s. 202.
121. Arbitration Act 1979, s. 3(7).
122. Ibid. s. 3(6).
123. Ibid. s. 8(4).
124. Ibid. s. 3(7).
125. See e.g. Lord Diplock's statement in 397 Parl. Deb., supra n. I, at col. 450; Commercial Court
Committee Report, supra n. 1, at p. 112. A party with limited bargaining power might be compelled to
renounce protection of the courts under the duress of losing business.
126. Arbitration Act 1979, s. 4(l)(a).
127. Ibid. s. 4(l)(b).
128. Ibid. s. 4(1)(c).
129. Ibid. s. 4(l)(ii).
130. See Dicey and Morris, Conflicl of Laws (9th edn. 1973), pp. 1124-33. S. 4(l)(ii) of the 1979 Act
thus seems merely cosmetic, perhaps the result of a fear that outsiders would not understand English law.
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In an opinion rendered in the first case to reach the House of Lords under
the 1979 Act,' 3 ' Lord Diplock stated that prohibition on pre-dispute
exclusion of judicial review of special category disputes was intended to
encourage the fertilisation of English law by the commerical community
32
through judicially reviewable arbitrations. In his words, it was:
to facilitate the continued performance by the courts of their useful function of preserving,
in the light of changes in technology and commercial practices adopted in various trades, the
comprehensiveness and certainty of English law as to the legal obligations assumed by
parties to commercial contracts of the classes listed, particularly those expressed in standard
terms....

The Act is silent on incorporation of exclusion agreements by reference to
institutional arbitration rules. Thus the effect of reference to the
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules is problematic.
Article 24(2) provides:
By submitting the dispute to arbitration by the International Chamber of Commerce, the
parties shall be deemed to have undertaken to carry out the resulting award without delay
and to have waived their right to any form of appeal insofar as such waiver can validly be
made.

The intent is clear, but the language does not fit neatly into the terms of
section 3 of the Act. The London Court of Arbitration suggests in the
preface to its International Arbitration Rules that parties wishing to exclude
judicial review should explicitly "agree to exclude any right of application
or appeal to the English courts in connexion with any question of-law
arising in the course of the arbitration or with respect to any award made".
The benefits of English lex loci arbitri include the power of the High
Court to compel obedience to interlocutory orders, as well as to empower
arbitrators so to do. This assistance may not be abrogated by an exclusion
agreement. The High Court or the arbitrator may order the examination of
witnesses, enforce discovery of documents, or extend the time for filing a
claim. "

Finally, it should be noted that the Act would not affect arbitration
conducted by the World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID). The ICSID Convention itself excludes

131. Pioneer Shipping v.B.T.P. Tioxide ("The Nema") 198113 W.L.R. 289.
132. Ibid. at p.302.
133. See Arbitration Act 1979, s. 5; Arbitration Act 1950, ss. 12 and 13. For a recent example, see
Consolidated Investment and Contracting Co. v. Saponaria The Virgo Shipping Co. [1978 3 All E.R. 988

(C.A.). Cargo owners "soothed into inactivity" by shipowner's insurers were allowed an extension of time
to bring the arbitration.
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judicial review, 134 as does the treaty establishing the Hague tribunal for the
35
settlement of US-Iranian claims.
D. JudicialAttitudes toward ArbitralAutonomy
THE text of the 1979 statute may be less important than the context of its

application. Old habits die hard. In one recent case, for example, Lord
Denning argued that an award should be remitted to an arbitrator who had
not understood that "the strict rules of the common law courts [concerning
36
interest on late demurrage] ... do not govern the practice of arbitrators".1
The contradiction startles: a local judge tries to intervene in the arbitral
process to ensure its detachment from local procedure.
Two recent decisions of the House of Lords, however, indicate a
developing judicial respect for arbitral autonomy. In the first case, Bremer
Vulkan v. South India Shipping, 137 a dispute arose over several vessels built
by a German shipyard for an Indian shipowner. The 1979 Act did not apply
in Bremer Vulkan, since the arbitration had been commenced prior to
August 1, 1979-the effective date of the Act. Nevertheless, the approach
of the House of Lords in Bremer Vulkan comports with the laissez-faire
spirit of the Act, in that a lower court was instructed not to interfere with an
arbitration.
West German law was applicable to the merits of the controversy, but the
parties submitted the dispute, concerning alleged defects in the vessels'
construction, to a London arbitrator. For a five-year period after the
arbitrator's appointment in 1972, neither the arbitrator nor the parties did
very much. The German shipyard finally requested-and was granted-an
injunction against further arbitral proceedings, on the ground that the
Indian shipowner's dilatory conduct had made it impossible to marshal
evidence for a proper hearing. In affirming the injunction, the Court of
Appeal construed the arbitration agreement to contain an implied covenant

134. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
(575 U.N.T.S. 159), Arts. 53 (finality of award) and 54 (contracting States to enforce award as if a
judgment of domestic court). The Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1966 provides
explicitly that the Arbitration Act of 1950 does not apply (with two exceptions) to ICSID arbitral
proceedings. See s. 3(2) of the Arbitration Act 1966. On the ICSID Convention, see generally Delaume,
"State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration" (1981) 75 A.J.LL. 748.
135. Part 11, Article IV(3) of the Agreement of Jan. 19, 1981. See generally Audit, "Les 'Accords'
d'Alger du 19 janvier 1981 tendant au R6glement des Differends entre les Etats-Unis et l'lran" (1981) 108
JournalDroit International713.
136. Tehno-lmpex v. Gebr van Weelde Scheepvartkantoor [1981] 2 All E.R. 669, at p. 679; Lord
Denning's view was a dissent.
137. [1981] 1All E.R. 289 (H.L.).
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to proceed with dispatch, and deemed the High Court to have inherent
power to restrain arbitration where a claimant's delay was such as would
have allowed dismissal of an action at law for "want of prosecution".' 38
In a three-to-two decision, the House of Lords held that a party's delay
was a matter to be dealt with by the arbitrator, not a judge. Accordingly,
the High Court was held to lack authority to restrain the proceedings. The
irony of the decision is that arbitral autonomy was protected in an instance
in which the High Court was attempting to prevent the parties from
dragging their feet, one of the most common complaints voiced about
international commercial arbitration.
In his opinion for the majority, Lord Diplock was careful to distinguish
the High Court's limited powers in a private consensual arbitration from its
possibly more extensive powers in reviewing arbitration conducted pursuant
to statute. 3 9 This distinction is significant because of the predisposition of
English judges to intervene in statutory arbitral proceedings under the guise
of correcting excess of authority even as against express parliamentary
prohibition of judicial review.140 The Rt. Hon. Sir John Donaldson, former
chairman of the Commercial Court Committee, has also emphasised the
less extensive judicial power to review consensual as opposed to statutory

arbitrations.

14'

The Nema, the first case under the 1979 Act to reach the House of
Lords,142 involved a cargo vessel that had been chartered for seven voyages
to haul titanium slag from Canada to Europe. Strikes in Quebec prevented
loading after the first trip, and the shipowner asked to cancel the charter
and to take possession of the vessel. The parties appointed the arbitrator in
mid-August 1979, only a couple of weeks after the Act's effective date.
Agreeing with the owner, the arbitrator found that the charterparty and its
several addenda had been "frustrated"; the dissatisfied charterer then
appealed under the new review procedure. The High Court found the
charterparty was not frustrated and ordered the Nema to return to Canada
to pick up another load of titanium slag. The matter then went to the Court
of Appeal and the House of Lords, both of which held that the arbitrator's

138. [1980] 1 All E.R. 420 (C.A.).
139. [1981] 1 All E.R. 289, at pp. 295-96. See also Pati Wilson & Co. A/S v. PartenreedereiHannah
Blumenthal, The Hannah Blumenthal 119831I All E.R. 34, in which the House of Lords unanimously
affirmed its decision in Bremer Vulkan.
140. See discussion of the Anisminic and Harrow School cases infra text accompanying nn. 159-65.

141. Address by Sir John Donaldson entitled "Judicial Review of Awards", delivered at the conference
"Forum London", Sept. 23, 1981.

142. Pioneer Shipping v. B. T.P. Tioxide("TheNema") [198113 W.L.R. 392. The guidelines for granting
leave to appeal, set forth by Lord Diplock in The Nema case have been considered recently in Italmare
Shipping v. Ocean Tanker [198211 W.L.R. 158 and BVSv. Kerman Shipping [1982] IW.L.R. 166.
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conclusion about the frustration of the contract should have been
accepted-even though, as Lord Denning put it, "in strict law the Nema
should have waited (in Quebec)-queuing up there- until the strike
ended". 43 According to Lord Denning, the arbitrator's decision should be
disturbed only if it is one "such that no reasonable arbitrator could reach",
or if the arbitrator "misdirected himself in law".'" The latter criterion
implies that the arbitrator looked to the wrong legal standard, not merely
that he misapplied appropriate principles.
Lord Diplock examined the 1979 Act's legislative history, in particular its
preoccupation with London's attractiveness as a situs for the resolution of
disputes arising from the "one-off" contract. 45 He stressed the
parliamentary intent to accord Laissez-faire treatment to "one-off'
contracts, and said that review should be granted only when it appears
''upon a mere perusal of the reasoned award itself without the benefit of
adversarial argument that the meaning ascribed to the clause to be
construed by the arbitrator is obviously wrong .. ,. that there was (not) more
than one possible view as to [its] meaning" 146 Lord Diplock further
remarked: ". . to exemplify what is meant by the convenient neologism 'a
one-off case' it would be hard to find a better exemplar [than the Nema
case].' ' 47 Surprisingly, the charterparty of the Nema was on a standard
form. The clause to be construed was "one-off", however, because it was
negotiated to amend a contract for a single voyage to accommodate
48
seven. 1
The statute circumscribes the High Court's discretion to grant leave to
appeal from an arbitrator's award to questions of law that "could
substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties" to the
arbitration. 149 According to Lord Denning, this means it must be a "point
of practical importance-not an academic point". 50 Lord Denning did not
say how judges should distinguish "practical" from "academic" legal
issues-if such can be done. Presumably, this would require a de minimus
amount to be set, depending on the controversy. For example, £1000 might
be "substantial" in a small arbitration but not in a large one.

143. [19801Q.B. 547; [1980] 3 W.L.R. 326; [1980] 3 All E.R. 117.
144. [198013 W.L;R. 326, at p. 337.
145. See Alexander Lecture, supra n. 1.
146. [198113 W.L.R.292, at p. 303.
147. Ibid. at p. 297. Earlier in his opinion Lord Diplock had said: "If ever there were a case which ...
ought never to have been allowed to get any further than the arbitrator's award, this was one": Ibid. at
p. 295.
148. See opinion by Lord Roskill, ibid. at pp. 305-06.
149. Arbitration Act 1979, s. 1(4).
150. [19801 W.L.R. 326, at p. 335.
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E. Excess of Authority
THE distinction between the judge who corrects fundamental procedural
unfairness, and the judge who imposes his own conclusions on the merits of
the dispute, stubbornly resists intellectually satisfactory articulation. As
mentioned above, the 1979 Act did not repeal the High Court's statutory
powers to remit awards for reconsideration by the arbitrator and to set aside
an award for arbitrator "misconduct". 5 ' According to the Commercial
Court Committee, the term "misconduct" covers "procedural errors and
omissions by arbitrators who are doing their best to uphold the highest
standards of their profession".'
One type of "misconduct" that may be significant is the rendering of an
award in excess of the arbitrator's authority. Commercial arbitration is a
consensual process, and thus an arbitrator has only the power granted him
by the parties. " An award that exceeds the arbitrator's authority may be no
different from one rendered in the absence of a valid arbitration agreement
as to the controverted issue. Two merchants may agree that an arbitrator
will settle disputes arising out of the sale of apples; but they have not
thereby accepted arbitration for a later contract to sell walnuts. If the
arbitration agreement vaguely refers to sales of "fruit", however, the scope
of the arbitral mission will depend on whether "fruit" includes only apples,
or whether the word is used with its botanical meaning to include the
contents of any seed plant's developed ovary, including walnuts. Judges in
other countries have had to struggle with the thin line between error of law
and excess of authority. 5 4 English courts prior to 1979 paid less attention to
this difficult issue in the context of commercial arbitration, since all
questions of law could be reviewed by the special case procedure.
Lord Denning has stated: "Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law, it
goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void . . .
Thus the future of commercial arbitration in England may depend on how
English judges face the elusive distinction between an error of law, which
may be removed from judicial scrutiny, and arbitrator excess of authority,
which presumably may not be removed from review. To illustrate, assume
that a licence provides for payment of royalties on the first of the year in
default of which the licensor may cancel the licence, and that the licence is

151. Arbitration Act 1950, s. 22 and s. 23 respectively.
152. Commercial Court Committee Report, supran. 1, at p. 17 (para. 67).
153. For a general discussion of excess of authority, see
W. Reisman, Nullity and Revision (1971).
154. See Park, op. cit.
supra n. 1, at p. 101. -.

155. Denning, The Discipline of the Law (1979), at p. 74.
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in fact cancelled for late payment. Assume further that the cancellation
gives rise to an arbitration, and the licensor is found liable for wrongful
termination of the licence. If no justification for late royalty payment exists
under the applicable law, the arbitrator has interpreted the contract
erroneously. It is equally arguable, however, that the arbitrator has done
something more: he has modified the contract's payment date. Unless this
power to modify the contract was given to the arbitrator by the submission
agreement, 56 he has acted impr6perly. It remains to be seen whether High
Court judges would use the power to remit an award'57 or the catch-all
prohibition of arbitrator "misconduct"' 58 to review such an award for
arbitrator excess of authority. "
Two cases may illustrate a reasoning by which English judges might
ignore exclusion agreements, as they have ignored unequivocal
parliamentary prohibitions on review of statutory arbitration and lower
court decision. These so-called "ouster clauses" were vitiated by the
Court's view that error of law constituted excess of authority.
One ouster clause received short shrift from the House of Lords in
Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Commission, 160 a case dealing with
a compensation claim for manganese mines lost during the 1956 Suez crisis.
Proof that the claimant and any successors in title were British nationals
was a prerequisite for compensation. The Foreign Compensation
Commission returned a negative finding on this point. The relevant statute
had declared: "The determination by the [Foreign Compensation]
Commission of any application made to them . . . shall not be called in
question in any court of law."' 6' Despite this clear statutory prohibition on
judicial review of the Commission's decisions, the House of Lords reversed
the Commission. Lord Pearce declared the Commission's decision a nullity,
saying:"[Wlhile engaged on a propei enquiry, the tribunal . . . may ask
itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was
not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its
' 62
jurisdiction [and] would cause its purported decision to be a nullity."'
63
In the case of Pearlmanv. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School,

156. For example, the arbitrator may have been given the power oftamiable composition discussed at
supra n. 30.
157. Arbitration Act 1950, s. 22.
158. Ibid. s. 23.
159. In this part of the article, excess of arbitral "authority" and excess of arbitral "mission" are used
interchangeably.
160. [1969J2 A.C. 147.

161. Foreign Compensation Act 1950, s. 4(4), cited in the Anisminic case [196912 A.C. 147, at p. 224.
162. [196912 A.C. 147, at p. 195.
163. [197813 W.L.R. 736 (C.A.).
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Lord Denning refused to give effect to another ouster clause: "[N]o
judgment [of the county court] shall be removed by appeal, motion,
certiorari or otherwise into any other court whatever . . . "'14 A tenant (Mr.
Pearlman) sought the right to purchase his house under the Leasehold
Reform Act of 1967. The right to purchase existed only for dwellings with a
taxable value falling below a statutory ceiling, which could be increased to
take into account "structural alterations" made by the tenant. Mr.
Pearlman claimed that a new central heating system was just such a
"structural alteration", and thus raised the value ceiling. The county court
determined it was not. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the
erroneous determination about the heating system was also an error as to
the lower court's jurisdiction. Lord Denning gave the following
6
explanation:
IT [he distinction between an error which entails absence of jurisdiction-and an error made
within the jurisdiction-is very fine. So fine indeed that it is rapidly being eroded . .. By
holding that [the heating system Iwas not a structural alteration ... or addition [the judge I
deprived himself of jurisdiction to determine [other Imatters.

These two cases must be considered with great caution, since they dealt with
the review of statutory arbitration and lower court decisions which
admittedly rest on a different foundation than review of private con67
sensual dispute resolution. Lord Diplock " and Sir John Donaldson
have both made this point forcefully. The Anisminic and Harrow School
cases, however, show a judicial boldness relevant to review of commercial
arbitration. Judges straining for the "right result" in a case may find a
broad definition of excess of authority to be a convenient path. While
arbitration lawyers can only welcome the comforting assurances of the
English bench and bar that judicial prerogatives will not be abused, specific
limits on judicial intervention may nevertheless be appropriate.
Limits on judicial review are most problematic with respect to the judge's
role as interpreter of the limits of the arbitral mission. Quis custodiet ipsos
custodies? One French case has drawn the line between error of law and
excess of authority by reference to the arbitrator's intent. Only an
intentional disregard of an arbitrator's mission is considered a reviewable
excess of authority. In Agence de Diffusion et de Publicit6 v. Socit6

164. County Courts Act 1959. s. 107, cited in the Harrow Schoolcase [197813 W.L.R. 736 (C.A.).
165. 119781 3 W.L.R. 736, at pp. 743-44.
166. See Lord Diplock's opinion in Bremer Vulkan v. South India Shipping [1981] 1 All E.R. 289, at pp.
295 -96.
167. Address by Sir John Donaldson entitled "Judicial Review of Awards: Finality v. Legality" delivered
as part of conference, "Forum London", Sept. 23, 1981. For a commentary on the conference, see Shenton,
"Forum London" (1982) 10Int.
Bus. Law 59.
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Coopgrative d'Etudes et de Librairie, an advertising agency sued a publisher
whose advertising it had managed.' 6 The arbitrator awarded damages
("indemnitM de clientele) according to trade practice rather than law. The
court held that by intentionally ignoring the law, in favour of custom, the
arbitrator had arrogated to himself the powers of amiable compositeur, to
decide according to his concept of fairness rather than the law. Since the
powers of amiable compositeur had not been granted by the parties, the
arbitrator acted outside the scope of the submission agreement, rendering
the award void.
111.CONCLUSION

"THE test of a first-rate intelligence," wrote the American novelist F. Scott
Fitzgerald, "is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same
time, and still retain the ability to function.' ' 6 9 Elaboration of an
appropriate standard of interaction between judge and arbitrator requires a
similar capacity to accept seemingly inconsistent principles: the law must be
applied correctly; yet adjudication must be binding. The commercial
community's need for finality in private dispute resolution competes with
the desirability of uniform application of law.
Wisdom dictates that the State of arbitration exercise some control over
the integrity of the proceedings and the interests of third parties. Prima
facie validity is accorded foreign arbitral awards under the 1958 New York
Arbitration Convention. Fairness requires that a procedurally defective
arbitration be susceptible to being annulled at the place where rendered.
The loser should not be forced to litigate issues such as arbitrator
corruption in all States where it has assets. Nor should an award benefit
from the presumptive validity accorded by the New York Convention when
there exists a fundamental disaccord between how the arbitrator decided
and how the parties to the dispute authorised him to decide. Control by the
lex loci arbitri, however, should be limited to ensuring respect for
traditional standards of fairness, the limits of the arbitral mission and the
rights of third parties.
English arbitration law still leaves the High Court with powers wide
enough to justify almost any intervention in the arbitral process, despite an

168. Cour de Paris (!ereChambre Suppl~mentaire)Feb. 4, 1966, reprinted in [19661 Revue de I'Arbitrage
27. See Mezger, "La Distinction entre l'Arbitre dispense d'observer la Regle de Loi et

'Arbitre statuant

sans Appel", in LiberAmicorumforMartin Domke, supra n. 6, p. 184.
169. Fitzgerald, The Crack-Up (1936), reprinted with other short stories in 1977 (Penguin) at p. 39.
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"exclusion agreement". There are no specific guidelines for the
circumstances justifying exercise of these powers. The arbitrator is left
between the Scylla of ill-defined autonomy and the Charybdis of unknown
judicial supervison. There is much to commend replacing the High Court's
power to set aside awards on the vague ground of arbitrator "misconduct"
with challenges of awards for enumerated procedural deficiencies. 70
Admittedly, rules flexible enough to be useful may not deter an aggressive
judge straining to impose his view of the "right result" in a controversy.
Nevertheless, guidelines would provide arbitration lawyers with a welcome
measure of predictability as to the grounds for remitting and annulling
awards.

170. Similar grounds for challenge of awards are now contained in the law of France (Art. 1502 and 1504,
Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile) and the United States (s. 10 of the US Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A
s. 10).

